

# Inferring causality from passive observations

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MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT

- ① why the relation between statistics and causality is tricky
- ② causal inference using conditional independences (statistical and general)
- ③ causal inference using other properties of joint distributions
- ④ causal inference in time series, quantifying causal strength
- ⑤ why causal problems matter for prediction

Part 1, continued: why the relation between statistics and causality is tricky

(remaining part on equivalence of Markov conditions)

# Factorization $\Rightarrow$ functional model

Generate each  $p(X_j|PA_j)$  in

$$p(X_1, \dots, X_n) = \prod_{j=1}^n p(X_j|PA_j)$$

by a deterministic function and a noise variable.

- Idea: “encode”  $X_j|pa_j$  (for all values  $pa_j$ ) into the noise  $U_j$ , and pick out the right one depending on  $pa_j$ .
- formally,  $U_j$  is a map satisfying

$$pa_j \mapsto X_j|pa_j$$

- define structural equation

$$f_j(pa_j, U_j) := U_j(pa_j) = X_j|pa_j$$

- special case easier to understand: if  $PA_j$  only takes  $d$  values,  $U_j$  is an  $d$ -dimensional random vector, and the structural equation picks out a component of the vector (see next slide)

## Simple case

Goal: generate  $P(Y|X)$  via structural equation

$$Y = f(X, E) \text{ with } E \perp\!\!\!\perp X$$

- let  $X$  attain values in  $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$
- let  $Y$  attain values in  $\mathcal{Y}$
- let  $E = (E_1, \dots, E_k)$  be vector valued, each  $E_j$  attaining values in  $\mathcal{Y}$
- let  $E_j$  have distribution  $P(Y|x_j)$
- define  $f(x_j, E) := E_j$
  
- note: joint distribution of  $E_1, \dots, E_k$  not relevant (ambiguity of noise distribution), only the marginals  $P(E_j)$  matter

## Quantitative causal statements

# Pearl's do calculus

- **Motivation:** goal of causality is to infer the effect of interventions
- distribution of  $Y$  given that  $X$  is set to  $x$ :

$$p(Y|do(X = x)) \text{ or } p(Y|do(x))$$

- don't confuse with  $p(Y|x)$
- can be computed from  $p$  and  $G$ , but not from  $p$  alone

# Computing $p(X_1, \dots, X_n | do(x_i))$

from  $p(X_1, \dots, X_n)$  and  $G$

- Start with causal factorization

$$p(X_1, \dots, X_n) = \prod_{j=1}^n p(X_j | PA_j)$$

- Replace  $p(X_i | PA_i)$  with  $\delta_{X_i, x_i}$

$$p(X_1, \dots, X_n) = \prod_{j \neq i} p(X_j | PA_j) \delta_{X_i, x_i}.$$



## Computing $p(X_k|do(x_i))$


- summation/integration over  $x_i$  yields

$$p(X_1, \dots, X_{i-1}, X_{i+1}, \dots, X_n | do(x_i)) = \prod_{j \neq i} p(X_j | PA_j(x_i)),$$

where  $PA_j(x_i)$  is obtained by substituting  $x_i$  into  $PA_j$ .

- obtain  $p(X_k|do(x_i))$  by marginalization


# Examples for $p(y|do(x)) = p(y|x)$




$X$  causes  $Y$  and there is no common cause of  $X$  and  $Y$

# Examples for $p(y|do(x)) \neq p(y|x)$

- $p(Y|do(x)) = p(Y) \neq p(Y|x)$




- $p(Y|do(x)) = p(Y) \neq p(Y|x)$



## Example: controlling for confounding

$X \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Y$  partly due to the confounder and partly due to  $X \rightarrow Y$ .



Computing  $p(Y|do(x))$  shows the part that is due to  $X$  causing  $Y$

## Controlling for confounding by deriving $p(Y|do(x))$

- causal factorization

$$p(X, Y, Z) = p(Z)p(X|Z)p(Y|X, Z)$$

- replace  $p(X|Z)$  with  $\delta_{X,x}$

$$P(X, Y, Z|do(x)) = p(Z)\delta_{X,x}p(Y|X, Z)$$

- marginalize

$$p(Y|do(x)) = \sum_z p(z)p(Y|x, z)$$

- given the causal DAG  $G$  on  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  and two nodes  $X_k, X_i$
- which nodes apart from  $X_k, X_i$  need to be observed to compute  $p(X_i | do\ x_k)$ ?

see e.g. results on backdoor criterion and frontdoor criterion in Pearl's book "Causality"

## Formal treatment of causal influence

- for **binary**  $X, Y$  we define the average causal effect by

$$ACE := p(Y = 1|do(X = 1)) - p(Y = 1|do(X = 0)).$$

(increase of probability of  $Y = 1$  by setting  $X$  to 1)

- for **real-valued**  $Y$  and **binary**  $X$  one defines

$$ACE := \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 1)] - \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = 0)]$$

(increase of expectation of  $Y$  by setting  $X$  to 1)

- for **real-valued**  $X, Y$  one also uses

$$ACE := \frac{d}{dx} \mathbb{E}[Y|do(X = x)]$$

(increase of expectation of  $Y$  by infinitesimal increase of  $X$ )

## Formal treatment of Simpson's paradox

- $p(y|do(x), z) = p(y|x, z)$  for this DAG.
- the drug helps males and females:

$$\begin{aligned}p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{drug}), \text{male}) &> p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{no drug}), \text{male}) \\p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{drug}), \text{female}) &> p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{no drug}), \text{female})\end{aligned}$$

- the drug helps also on the average:

$$p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{drug})) > p(\text{recovery}|do(\text{no drug})),$$

because

$$p(y|do(x)) = \sum_z p(y|x, z)p(z)$$



# Naive solution of the coffee paradox

- observe as many other variables as possible: smoking, nutrition, sports, height, weight, race
  
- compare life expectancy of people for which all variables are the same except for coffee consumption

## Correct solution of the coffee paradox

- $X_i$  (daily coffee consumption) and  $X_j$  (length of ones life) are part of a large causal DAG
- there is no arrow from  $X_j$  to  $X_i$
- observed  $X_i \not\perp\!\!\!\perp X_j$  can be due to directed paths from  $X_i$  to  $X_j$  or due to paths from common causes to both  $X_i$  and  $X_j$
- to asses whether  $X_i$  influences  $X_j$  we need to block all paths from common causes to  $X_i$

# What's wrong with the naive solution

conditioning on all the other variables

- screens off indirect influence  
(e.g. if coffee influences weight and weight influences life expectancy)
- generates dependences via selection bias  
(however, hard to imagine a common effect of coffee drinking and life expectancy)

## Part 2: causal inference using conditional independences


- **why the Markov condition is not enough**  
additional postulate: causal faithfulness
- **algorithms for causal inference**
- **causal inference from non-statistical observations**  
defining similarities of single objects

Why the Markov condition is not enough

# Causal inference from observational data

Can we infer  $G$  from  $P(X_1, \dots, X_n)$ ?


- MC only describes which sets of DAGs are consistent with  $P$
- $n!$  many DAGs are consistent with any distribution



- reasonable rules for preferring **simple** DAGs required

Prefer those DAGs for which all observed conditional independences are implied by the Markov condition

- **Idea:** generic choices of parameters yield faithful distributions
- **Example:** let  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$  for the DAG



- not faithful, **direct** and **indirect** influence compensate

# Examples of unfaithful distributions (1)

Cancellation of direct and indirect influence in linear models


$$X = U_X$$

$$Y = \alpha X + U_Y$$

$$Z = \beta X + \gamma Y + U_Z$$

with independent noise terms  $U_X, U_Y, U_Z$

$$\beta + \alpha\gamma = 0 \Rightarrow X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$$






## Examples of unfaithful distributions (2)

binary causes with XOR as effect

- for  $p(X), p(Y)$  uniform:  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z, Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$ .  
i.e., unfaithful (since  $X, Z$  and  $Y, Z$  are connected in the graph).



- for  $p(X), p(Y)$  non-uniform:  $X \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Z, Y \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Z$ .  
i.e., faithful

# Conditional-independence based causal inference

Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines and Pearl

**Causal Markov condition + Causal faithfulness:**

- accept only those DAGs  $G$  as causal hypotheses for which

$$(X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | Z)_G \Leftrightarrow (X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | Z)_p.$$

- identifies causal DAG up to Markov equivalence class (DAGs that imply the same conditional independences)


# Markov equivalence class

**Theorem** (Verma and Pearl, 1990): two DAGs are Markov equivalent iff they have the same skeleton and the same  $v$ -structures.

**skeleton:** corresponding undirected graph


**$v$ -structure:** substructure  $X \rightarrow Y \leftarrow Z$  with no edge between  $X$  and  $Z$

# Markov equivalent DAGs



same skeleton, no v-structure

# Markov equivalent DAGs



same skeleton,  $v$  structure at  $W$

## Algorithms for causal inference

# Algorithmic construction of causal hypotheses

IC algorithm by Verma & Pearl (1990) to reconstruct DAG from  $p$

idea:


- ① Construct skeleton
- ② Find v-structures
- ③ direct further edges that follow from
  - graph is acyclic
  - all v-structures have been found in 2)

## Construct skeleton

**Theorem:**  $X$  and  $Y$  are linked by an edge iff there is no set  $S_{XY}$  such that

$$(X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | S_{XY})_G .$$

**Explanation:** dependence that is due to indirect links can be screened off by conditioning



$$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | \{Z, W\} .$$

**Faithfulness implies:** edge  $X - Y$  exists iff there is a set  $S_{X,Y}$  such that

$$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | S_{XY} .$$

( $S_{XY}$  is called a Sepset for  $X, Y$ )



# Efficient construction of skeleton

PC algorithm by Spirtes & Glymour (1991)

iteration over size of Sepset

- 1 remove all edges  $X - Y$  with  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$
- 2 remove all edges  $X - Y$  for which there is a neighbor  $Z \neq Y$  of  $X$  with  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | Z$
- 3 remove all edges  $X - Y$  for which there are two neighbors  $Z_1, Z_2 \neq Y$  of  $X$  with  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | Z_1, Z_2$
- 4 ...

# Advantages

- many edges can be removed already for small Sepsets
- testing all sets  $S_{XY}$  containing the adjacencies of  $X$  is sufficient
- depending on sparseness, algorithm only requires independence tests with small conditioning tests
- running time only polynomial in  $n$  if DAG has bounded degree


# Find v-structures

- given  $X - Z - Y$  with  $X$  and  $Y$  non-adjacent
- given  $S_{XY}$  with  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \mid S_{XY}$   
a priori, there are 4 possible orientations:

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} X \rightarrow Z \rightarrow Y \\ X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y \\ X \leftarrow Z \leftarrow Y \end{array} \right\} Z \in S_{XY}$$
$$X \rightarrow Z \leftarrow Y \quad Z \notin S_{XY}$$


**Orientation rule:** create v-structure if  $Z \notin S_{XY}$

## Direct further edges (Rule 1)




(otherwise we get a new  $v$ -structure)

## Direct further edges (Rule 2)



(otherwise one gets a cycle)

## Direct further edges (Rule 3)



(could not be completed without creating a new  $v$ -structure)

# Conditional independence tests

- **discrete case:** contingency tables
  - **idea:** for each  $\mathbf{z}$ , compare relative frequencies of  $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$  with product of relative frequency of  $\mathbf{x}$  with relative frequency of  $\mathbf{y}$
  - **problem:** if  $\mathbf{Z}$  attains many different values, many pairs  $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$  occur only once unless the sample size is huge
- **multi-variate Gaussian case:** covariance matrix contains all information about conditional independences

non-Gaussian continuous case: challenging, recent progress via reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces (Fukumizu...Zhang...)


# Improvements

- CPC (conservative PC) by Ramsey, Zhang, Spirtes (1995) uses weaker form of faithfulness
- FCI (fast causal inference) by Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines (1993) and Spirtes, Meek, Richardson (1999) infers causal links in the presence of latent common causes
- for implementations of the algorithms see homepage of the TETRAD project at Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh



# Limitation of independence based approach:

- many DAGs impose the same set of independences



$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \mid Z$  for all three cases (“Markov equivalent DAGs”)

- method useless if there are no conditional independences
- non-parametric conditional independence testing is hard
- ignores important information:  
only uses yes/no decisions “conditionally dependent or not”  
without accounting for the kind of dependences...

# Application: Brain Computer Interfaces

- **Goal:** Paralyzed subjects communicate by activating certain brain regions



- **Open problem:** Performance of subjects varies strongly
- **Hypothesis:** Attention influenced by oscillations in the  $\gamma$ -frequency band
  - indeed,  $\gamma$  seems to influence the sensorimotor rhythm (SMR) since conditional dependences support the DAG



(Grosse-Wentrup, Schölkopf, Hill *NeuroImage* 2011)

# Take home messages


principles of independence based causal inference

- Markov equivalence class is the set of all DAGs that imply the same set of conditional independences
- Markov condition and faithfulness allow for identifying the Markov equivalence class of the true DAG
- algorithms start by first constructing undirected links (uniquely determined by the Markov equivalence class)
- then part of the links are directed and some remain undirected
- the partially directed graph represents the Markov equivalence class

## Next step: Dropping causal sufficiency

So far, we have always assumed that no pair of observed variables have unobserved common causes

Let  $\mathcal{O} := \{X_1, \dots, X_n\}$  be observed and  $\mathcal{L} := (L_1, \dots, L_k)$  be latent variables



Then a latent structure is a DAG  $G$  on  $\mathcal{O} \cup \mathcal{L}$ .

## We will now see that...

- causal inference is also possible without causal sufficiency
- for given set  $\mathcal{O}$ , there is an infinity of latent structures
- causal inference then seems to search over an infinity of structures
- nevertheless, inferring causal relations among observed variables requires searching over finitely many structures only

# Representing latent structures with MAGs

maximal ancestral graphs:

graph containing 3 types of edges:

$$X \rightarrow Y \quad X \leftarrow Y \quad X \leftrightarrow Y$$

## semantics:

- $X \rightarrow Y$  means that there is a directed path from  $X$  to  $Y$  in  $G$  for which each observable non-endpoint node is a collider and an ancestor of  $X$  or  $Y$   
(that is, the influence of  $X$  and  $Y$  cannot be screened off by conditioning)
- $X \leftrightarrow Y$  means that there is a confounder, i.e., a node  $L \in \mathcal{L}$  having directed paths to  $X$  and  $Y$

# Idea of latent model reconstruction

- **construction of skeleton:**

remains the same:  $X$  and  $Y$  are adjacent iff there is no set  $S_{XY}$  with

$$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \mid S_{XY}$$

- **construction of  $v$ -structures:**

orient  $X - Z - Y$  to  $X - > Z < - Y$  whenever  $Z \notin S_{XY}$   
(note: whether there are arrowheads at  $X$  and  $Y$  is left often)

- **construct definite arrows**

some independence patterns tell us for some edges which of the 3 types of links is present



## Example: recognizing $Y$ -structures

$\mathcal{O} = \{X, Y, Z, W\}$  with


$$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$$

$$XY \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid W$$

as generating set of the independences

# Example: recognizing $Y$ -structures


Step 1: construct the skeleton



- remove  $X - Y$  because  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$
- remove  $X - W$  because  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp W | Z$
- remove  $Y - W$  because  $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp W | Z$

# Example: recognizing $Y$ -structures


identifying  $v$ -structure



- add arrowheads to get a collider at  $Z$  because  $Z \notin S_{XY}$
- leave it open whether there are arrowheads at the other end of the edges

## Example: recognizing $Y$ -structures

orient further edges such that no additional  $v$ -structures are created



- there cannot be an arrowhead at  $Z$  because  $Z \in S_{X,W}$
- there must be an arrowhead at  $W$  because every edge has at least one arrowhead

**conclusion:**  $Z$  influences  $W$ !

## Hence...

- faithfulness and Markov condition on  $\mathcal{O} \cup \mathcal{L}$  sometimes imply causal conclusions for  $\mathcal{O}$
- one can prove causal influence without assuming causal sufficiency

# Causal inference from single observations

- drop the i.i.d. assumption  $\rightarrow$  radical approach: causal inference without probabilities
- this approach will help to justify new *statistical* causal inference rules

forget about statistics for a moment...

– how do we come to causal conclusions in *every-day* life?


these 2 objects are similar...



– *why* are they so similar?



# Conclusion: common history



similarities require an *explanation*

# what kind of similarities require an explanation?



here we would *not* assume that anyone has copied the design...

..the pattern is too simple

- similarities require an explanation only if the pattern is sufficiently complex

# consider a binary sequence

## **Experiment:**

2 persons are instructed to write down a string with 1000 digits

## **Result:**

Both write 1100100100001111110110101010001...

(all 1000 digits coincide)

## the **naive** statistician concludes



“There must be an agreement between the subjects”

correlation coefficient 1 (between digits) is highly significant for sample size 1000 !

- reject statistical independence
- infer the existence of a causal relation

## another mathematician recognizes...

$$11.0010010000111111011010101001... = \pi$$

- subjects may have come up with this number independently because it follows from a simple law
- superficially strong similarities are not necessarily significant if the pattern is too simple

How do we measure simplicity versus complexity of patterns / objects?

# Kolmogorov complexity

(Kolmogorov 1965, Chaitin 1966, Solomonoff 1964)  
of a binary string  $x$

- $K(x)$  = length of the shortest program with output  $x$  (on a Turing machine)
- interpretation: number of bits required to describe the rule that generates  $x$   
neglect string-independent additive constants; use  $\stackrel{+}{=}$  instead of  $=$
- strings  $x, y$  with low  $K(x), K(y)$  cannot have much in common
- $K(x)$  is uncomputable
- probability-free definition of information content



# Conditional Kolmogorov complexity

- $K(y|x)$ : length of the shortest program that generates  $y$  from the input  $x$ .
- number of bits required for describing  $y$  if  $x$  is given as background information
- $K(y|x^*)$  length of the shortest program that generates  $y$  from  $x^*$ , i.e., the shortest compression  $x$ .
- subtle difference:  $x$  can be generated from  $x^*$  but not vice versa because there is no algorithmic way to find the shortest compression

Information of  $x$  about  $y$

- $I(x : y) := K(x) + K(y) - K(x, y) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(x) - K(x|y^*) \stackrel{\pm}{=} K(y) - K(y|x^*)$
- Interpretation: number of bits saved when compressing  $x, y$  jointly rather than compressing them independently

## Analogy to statistics:

- replace strings  $x, y$  (=objects) with random variables  $X, Y$  having the joint distribution  $P(X, Y)$
- replace Kolmogorov complexity with Shannon entropy
- replace algorithmic mutual information  $I(x : y)$  with statistical mutual information  $I(X; Y)$

**Let  $x$  and  $y$  be strings that describe two objects/observations in nature. Whenever  $I(x : y) \gg 0$ , there is some kind of causal relation between  $x$  and  $y$ .**

- causal relation is  $x \rightarrow y$ ,  $y \rightarrow x$ , or  $x \leftarrow z \rightarrow y$
- analogy to Reichenbach's principle of common cause:  
whenever  $I(X : Y) \gg 0$  for two variables  $X$  and  $Y$  there is a causal relation of the form  $X \rightarrow Y$ ,  $Y \rightarrow X$ , or  $X \leftarrow Z \rightarrow Y$ .

$$I(\text{★} : \text{★}) = K(\text{★})$$

The equation illustrates algorithmic mutual information. On the left, the expression  $I(\text{★} : \text{★})$  shows two yellow seven-pointed stars. The first star has a small red dot in its center, while the second star is plain. This represents the mutual information between two objects that differ only by a small, specific detail. On the right, the expression  $K(\text{★})$  shows a single plain yellow seven-pointed star, representing the Kolmogorov complexity of the object. The equality indicates that the mutual information between these two objects is equal to the complexity of the object itself, as the only shared information is the object's basic structure.

# conditional algorithmic mutual information

- $I(x : y|z) = K(x|z) + K(y|z) - K(x, y|z)$
- Information that  $x$  and  $y$  have in common when  $z$  is already given
- Formal analogy to statistical mutual information:

$$I(X : Y|Z) = S(X|Z) + S(Y|Z) - S(X, Y|Z)$$

- Define conditional independence:

$$I(x : y|z) \approx 0 : \Leftrightarrow x \perp\!\!\!\perp y|z$$

# Postulate: Algorithmic Markov condition

(Janzing & Schölkopf), Causal inference using the algorithmic Markov condition, 2010

Given  $n$  observations  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  (formalized as strings)

Given its direct causes  $pa_j$ , every  $x_j$  is conditionally algorithmically independent of its non-effects:

$$x_j \perp\!\!\!\perp nd_j \mid pa_j^*$$

# Equivalence of algorithmic Markov conditions

For  $n$  strings  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  the following conditions are equivalent

- Local Markov condition:

$$I(x_j : nd_j | pa_j^*) \stackrel{\pm}{=} 0$$

- Global Markov condition:

$R$  d-separates  $S$  and  $T$  implies  $I(S : T | R^*) \stackrel{\pm}{=} 0$

- Recursion formula for joint complexity

$$K(x_1, \dots, x_n) \stackrel{\pm}{=} \sum_{j=1}^n K(x_j | pa_j^*)$$

→ another analogy to statistical causal inference



# Take home messages

- we have developed a framework for causal inference from individual observations
- it should be applicable to real world data where good compression schemes are available
- we will later use it for justifying novel *statistical* causal inference rules: select among causal DAGs within the same Markov equivalence class

# Generalized PC

Steudel et al: Causal Markov condition for submodular information measures

PC algorithm also works with generalized conditional independence derived from information functions  $R$  other than Shannon entropy

## Examples:

- 1  $R :=$  number of different words in a text
- 2  $R :=$  compression length (e.g. Lempel Ziv is approximately submodular)
- 3  $R :=$  logarithm of period length of a periodic function

example 2 yielded reasonable results on simple real texts (different versions of a paper abstract)

# Exercises

## 4 do-calculus:

Let  $X, Y, Z$  be binary and coupled by the deterministic structural equations

$$Z = U_Z$$

$$X = Z$$

$$Y = X \oplus Z \oplus U_Y,$$

where  $\oplus$  denotes the XOR,  $U_Y$  is a binary attaining 1 with probability  $\epsilon < 1/2$  and  $U_Z$  is a binary attaining 1 with probability  $\delta \neq 1/2$

- Argue/show that  $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$ .
- Show formally that  $X$  has an influence on  $Y$  by proving that

$$p(Y|do(X = 1)) \neq p(Y|do(X = 0)).$$

## 5 Faithfulness:

Given the causal DAG  $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$ . Let  $Y$  be deterministically depend on  $X$ , i.e., the structural equation for  $Y$  reads

$$Y = f(X).$$

Show that the joint distribution of  $X, Y, Z$  is not faithful.

⑥ **Markov equivalence:**

give all DAGs with 3 nodes whose Markov equivalence class consists of only one element.